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Information security is a global problem that 
influences all countries that are considered part of 
the information society. Information managers are 
regularly faced with a variety of security surveys 
showing the latest security trends. Recent security 
surveys show an increased concern about computer 
crime. The question is, how can an organisation 
assess and use this information, and do these 
surveys hold any value for managers working 
in the field of infor:mation security? 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore, from 
an information manager's perspective, the 
confusing issue of security surveys and 
the data that they present. The issue that 
information managers and information 
security managers face is how can this data be 
used to make key organisational decisions in 
relation to security management? 
As the information society has developed and 
expanded, so too have concerns regarding 
information security. Most of these concerns 
have been reported via surveys. Annual or 
regular surveys are released by governments 
and organisations re,:,ealing the state of security 
in particular countries, for example, AusCERT 
(Australia), CSIIFBI (USA) and the Department 
of Trade and Industry (UK). Some countries 
have linked security issues to the development of 
strategies in relation to developing an information 
society, for example, Switzerland (Forum ICT 
2007). It should be added that the information 
society consists of separate physical countries, 
and that within these separate countries 
organisations can have different security cultures 
(Hofstede 1994; Trompenaars 1997). 
Various annual security surveys show that 
there are increased concerns about security 
risks and particular technologies. The growth 
of the Internet has resulted in associated 
security risks, such as online fraud, identity 
theft and hacking. While this new technology 
does bring great benefits, the major question 
for organisations is: How can this technology 
be managed securely? 
This paper looks at information security 
practices in Australia and New Zealand based 
on key surveys, and determines whether 
security practices and issues are generic. It also 
suggests how organisations can use the data 
that is presented. 
Survey results 
AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 
A survey undertaken by AusCERT during 2006 
was based on the responses of 389 Australian 
organisations (AusCERT 2006). This was the 
last survey of its kind to date within Australia. 
Questionnaires with business reply-paid 
envelopes were sent to 2024 IT managers or 
their equivalents from a range of Australian 
public and private sector organisations. 
These managers were invited to complete the 
questionnaire online via a secure website, 
hosted by ACNielsen, or return the paper 
questionnaire using the reply-paid envelope. 
Responses were also sought from a range of 
private and public sector industry groups, 
including the Trusted Information Sharing 
Network (TISN), from which 19 members 
were invited to complete the questionnaire 
via the secure website. Responses to the 
survey totalled 389, which included 238 paper 
submissions and 151 online submissions. In 
total, the response rate to the survey was 17 
per cent and all responses were anonymous 
(AusCERT 2006). 
The major trends from the survey are listed as 
follows: 
• 22 per cent of organisations indicated 
that they had experienced a security 
incident and the average cost of the 
damage was $A241,150. 
• 56 per cent of respondents invested 
less than 5 per cent of their IT security 
budget on security. 
• 55 per cent of respondents indicated 
that they had no IT staff with security 
qualifications. 
• 34 per cent of respondents felt they 
were part of the Australian critical 
infrastructure, that is, those physical 
facilities, supply chains, information 
technologies and communication 
networks that if destroyed, degraded or 
rendered unavailable for an extended 
period, would adversely influence the 
social or economic wellbeing of the 
nation, or affect Australia's ability to 
ensure national security (TISN 2008). 
The top three security incidents reported were: 
1. Insider abuse ofInternet access, email or 
computer system resources 
2. Laptop theft 
3. Virus or worm infection 
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In terms of security standards used, the top 
standards used by Australian organisations were: 
• AS 17799 (2003) - 45 per cent; 
• AS 7779 (2001) - 31 per cent; 
• Vendor-specific standards or guides -
31 per cent; 
• Industry-specific IT standards -
31 per cent; 
• State government IT security standards 
- 18 per cent. 
It was also reported that 95 per cent of 
respondents had media back-up procedures; 93 
per cent had user access management policies; 
78 per cent had an external network access 
policy and 72 per cent had a user responsibility 
policy (AusCERT 2006). 
In summary, the key findings of the Australian 
survey were that a minority of Australian 
organisations find themselves victims of 
information security crime and suffer an 
average annual loss of $A241,150. The survey 
also showed that the majority of Australian 
organisations spent less than 5 per cent of 
their IT budget per year protecting their 
systems, which is an area of great concern. It 
was also highlighted that the biggest threat to 
Australian organisations comes from within 
the organisation itself, namely by staff misusing 
organisational resources. The survey also 
indicated that while security standards had little 
impact, there was a high usage of information 
security tools relating to technology, for 
example, media back-up procedures and user 
access management policies. 
An alternative view of the survey was proposed 
by TISN in 2006. TISN determined that the 
positive trends in the survey included a 
marked reduction in the number of reported 
cyber-attacks, and a rise in the number of 
organisations that were free from detected 
internal attacks. Participants in the survey 
also recognised that spam was more than 
just a nuisance that wastes time and clogs up 
valuable server space. It was reported that 90 
per cent of respondents were using spam filters, 
not only to stop junk email, but also to protect 
systems against malware and cyber-attacks. 
The TISN view of the report also indicated 
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that financial losses from both cyber-attacks 
and external attacks were rising. These results 
indicate that as organisations increase their 
connectivity to external networks, including 
the Internet, they increase their exposure 
to cyber-threats. Another concerning trend 
was the reported decrease in spending on 
IT security, and the reduction in levels of 
protective security. Given the current nature 
of the threat environment, the report stated 
" ... now is not the time to be winding back 
on protective security counter-measures or 
reducing IT security budgets." 
" ... THE BIGGEST SECURITY THREAT TO 
AUSTRALIAN ORGANISATIONS COMES 
FROM WITHIN THE ORGANISATION 
ITSELF, NAMELY BY STAFF MISUSING 
ORGANISATIONAL RESOURCES." 
TISN also stated that there was a significant 
change in the types of attacks reported. Their 
analysis showed that while there had been 
a reduction in viruses and worms, there had 
been an increase in Trojan attacks and root 
kit infections. This indicates a change in why 
hackers do what they do, in that they are no 
longer just seeking kudos from their peers, but 
they may also now be driven by financial gain. 
A NEW ZEALAND PERSPECTIVE 
In 2007, the results of the second national 
New Zealand computer security survey were 
reported. The survey results were based on 
the responses of 113 New Zealand computer 
security practitioners (Quinn 2007). 
The major trends from the survey are listed 
as follows: 
• 87 per cent of organisations indicated 
that they had experienced a security 
incident in which the average cost of 
damage was $NZI3,000. 
• 1Wo-thirds of New Zealand 
organisations invest~dless than 5 per 
cent of their IT budget~n security. 
• 53 per cent of responde'hts indicated 
that they had no IT staff with security 
qualifications. 
The top three security incidents reported were: 
1) Viruses 
2) Laptop or mobile asset theft 
3) Insider abuse of net access or email 
In terms of security standards used, the top 
standards used by New Zealand organisations 
were: 
• AS/NZS ISO/lEC 17799.2001 (ASI 
NZS444.1) - 40 per cent; 
• Other industry-specific IT standards - 35 
per cent; 
• Vendor-specific standards or guides - 27 
per cent; 
• Security in government sectors (SIGS) -
25 per cent; 
• AS/NZS 17799.2.2000 (also known atASI 
NZS444.2) - 18 per cent. 
It was also reported that 96 per cent of 
respondents had media back-up procedures; 96 
per cent had user access management policies; 
80 per cent had an external network access 
policy and 76 per cent had a documented 
security responsibility policy (Quinn 2007). 
The key findings of the New Zealand survey 
showed that the majority of New Zealand 
organisations were victims of computer crime 
and suffered an average loss of$NZ13,OOO per 
year. The survey also showed that two-thirds of 
New Zealand organisations invested less than 
5 per cent of their annual IT budget in security. 
New Zealand organisations' biggest security 
threats were from outside the organisation in 
the form of viruses. The survey also indicated 
the minimal influence of security standards. 
PROBLEMS AND USAGE OF SECURITY SURVEYS 
The key problem is what do these statistical 
trends that are reported in security surveys 
actually show? The statistics presented from 
these surveys are superficial in that there is no 
discussion of what the statistics and statements 
actually mean. Because of this, the idea of any 
comparison between the surveys conducted in 
Australia and New Zealand is unworkable. 
But the value of national security surveys 
should not be discounted completely - just used 
with caution. The autl;lOrs have determined 
that there are advantages and disadvantages of 
using national security surveys, which should 
be considered by IT managers. 
One key advantage of national security 
surveys is that they help to raise general 
awareness about security issues that are 
either new or have become more significant 
over time. Security surveys also allow media 
organisations to report about security issues 
to the general populace and allow other 
organisations to have access to marketing 
information that could be used to sell or to 
promote products. Overall, these surveys 
provide a very basic snapshot of the state of 
security within a particular country. 
However, one of the disadvantages of national 
security surveys is that the sample sizes used 
are generally very small. For example, the 
Australian survey discussed in this paper 
involved 389 organisations and the New 
Zealand survey involved 113 organisations. 
The organisations involved in the surveys are 
generally government and larger organisations, 
with little consideration given to smaller 
organisations. This is indeed a disadvantage as 
smaller organisations represent the majority of 
commercial organisations in these countries. 
Furthermore, the questions used within the 
surveys may not have any relevance and the 
outcome of the questions may not have any 
meaningful impact in relation to security 
management. Overall, the issue of interpreting 
results from such surveys and determining 
their meaning is problematic. 
Further investigation into the samples used in 
the AusCERT survey (AusCERT 2006) identifies 
interesting trends presented in Table 1. What is 
of interest is the relationship between response 
rates and industry type. While most responses 
came from the manufacturing sector, the 
sectors in which the highest response rates 
were expected (information technology and 
telecommunication) had very low rates of 
p.articipation. This means that the respondent 
sample does not truly represent Australian 
industry and also raises questions about the 
value of a national survey. There is no discussion 
within the survey on whether the respondents 
represent large, medium, small or micro-sized 
)} 
DEAKIN BUSINESS REVIEW 3S 
organisations, which again raises concerns 
about the validity of the survey findings. 
The other interesting point is that the response 
rate to the AusCERT survey shown in Table 1 
actually represents a response r:ate of 101 per cent. 
The future of these national security surveys 
is currently under review. In Australia, in 2006, 
AusCERT spent $A44,000 on producing the 
national computer crime survey from funds 
made available by the Attorney-General's 
department. However, in 2007 these funds were 
redirected to support a larger computer crime 
survey that will be published in November 
2008. The Australian Institute of Criminology 
has undertaken a new survey (Rossi 2007), but 
to date these results have not been released. In 
2008, AusCERT released a new national survey, 
but this new survey was based on horne usage 
of computers (AusCERT 2008). 
TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS IN AUSCERT 2006 SURVEY ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY 
RANK INDUSTRY PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS 
Manufacturing 19 
2 Local government 11 
3 Education/Research 9 
4 State government 7 
5 Finance 6 
6 Medical health 6 
7 Retail 6 
8 Transport 4 
9 Utilities 4 
10 Wholesale 4 
11 Federal government 4 
12 Personal and other services 3 
13 Other 3 
14 Information technology 2 
15 Legal 2 
16 Cultural and recreational services 2 
17 Mining/Resources 2 
\ 
18 Construction 2 
'. )-
19 Hospitality "\. 2 .... 
20 Property and business services 2 
21 Telecommunication 
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Conclusion 
It is clear from the findings of this paper that 
the role of national security surveys is very 
limited. The results of the surveys only explain 
superficial detail in relation to security. Most 
of the results are based on basic percentages, 
and lack any formal statistical analysis. The 
surveys are also based on very small sample 
sizes that are not truly representative of 
national organisations. The data and security 
trends shown in these national surveys are 
not detailed enough to provide information 
managers with sufficient information to 
make strategic decisions or to develop new 
organisational policies. 
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